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VALUE THROUGH INNOVATION IN LONG-TERM SERVICE DELIVERY: 
FACILITY MANAGEMENT IN AN AUSTRALIAN PPP 
 
Abstract 
Purpose - Public-private partnerships (PPPs) and other innovative procurement mechanisms 
are frequently used to deliver both an asset and a public service over a protracted period. The 
value streams to the parties involved can be complex, but generally arise from the satisfactory 
provision of infrastructure that is fit for purpose throughout its life. This research investigates 
the effectiveness of the Facility Management (FM) function in delivering long-term value to 
both the client and consortium.   
Design/methodology/approach - This paper describes a case study of a PPP in Australia that 
delivered social infrastructure in multiple locations to a State Government.  Drawing upon 
multiple perspectives from within the consortium it identifies the influences on value 
generation through innovation by the FM function. 
Findings - The ability of an Australian FM contractor to provide value within a PPP context 
has been shown to reflect some of the attributes described in literature. However the extent of 
innovation, especially in the design and construction phases has been limited by 
organisational history and capability, relational and contextual issues. 
Originality/value – This research highlights a flaw in the rhetoric relating to PPP delivery, 
namely the disconnection between the asset delivery and service delivery phases, which stifles 
the consortium’s capacity to innovate and maximise value. It reveals a set of influences that 
both resonate with the literature and plausibly explain the suboptimal performance of the FM 
function within an Australian PPP. In doing so it provides the basis for wider investigation of 
the problem. 
Keywords - PPP, facility management, service delivery. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the past two decades a variety of relational procurement mechanisms have been 
developed in order to deliver assets and services in the constructed environment. 
Typically such assets have been associated with social, national, or economic 
infrastructure and the services have been associated with their operation, including 
basic maintenance or the delivery of non-core services throughout their life. This 
range of activities has come to be delivered by the facility management profession. 
The financial/commercial/legal mechanisms developed to facilitate such activities can 
be generalised as projects where fees for use are either recouped directly from 
government bodies, or from the public through the granting of long term service 
concessions. Chief amongst these are Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) (Buxbaum & 
Ortiz, 2007) though a full range of adjacent procurement instruments also exist such 
as build-operate-transfer or build-own-operate-transfer (Cheung, Rowlinson, Jefferies, 
& Lau, 2005).  
Whatever form the project takes, its initiation requires a public sector body to 
identify a pressing service need, followed by an invitation to negotiate for the 
provision of service. This is made to an embryonic body that typically includes 
financial, construction, and operational service provision functions, which morphs into 
a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). For the client body this provides a single point of 
legal accountability. Over time a range of competing SPVs present their cases for 
technical and financial competence and innovation to the client, and eventually one 
will triumph (Clifton & Duffield, 2006). 
From the client's perspective issues such as risk transfer, innovation, superior 
whole-of-life outcomes (as compared to public sector-only service provision) are 
considered when evaluating competing propositions, with the ultimate objective of 
achieving demonstrable value-for-money. Such projects often comprise two distinct 
phases, the first being the delivery of the constructed asset whilst the second is the 
effective delivery of services during its operational life (Clifton & Duffield, 2006). It 
is this latter phase that has the most impact upon an asset’s whole-of-life costs and it 
would seem logical that the elements within the SPV associated with the operational 
phase of such projects would have the potential to influence, both positively and 
negatively, the overall success of the project (Kadefors, 2008). 
The rhetoric – both from government client-side and private sector supply-side 
(e.g. Wakeford & Valentine, 2001) – in relation to PPP projects (and other derivatives 
such as Private Finance Initiative projects) has been that by integrating built asset and 
ongoing service provision within a single SPV, there is an improvement in the quality 
of service thus obtained, and a reduction in the risk that the public sector are exposed 
to: increased value to the client is the expected consequence. It is therefore perhaps 
surprising that service failure is frequently reported within PPP projects: these reports 
couch such failures in terms of the failure of the supply-side consortium as a single 
entity (Ng, Wong, & Wong, 2011), since liability for failure resides with this rather 
than one of its constituent parts. Nevertheless it is clear that as a project moves into its 
operational phase any responsibility for service provision is likely to reside with the 
FM function. 
Again the rhetoric associated with PPPs suggests that it is in the interests of the 
organisations that comprise the SPV bidding for a project to collaborate in a cohesive 
way during bid preparation in order to minimise the risk of project 
failure/underperformance, and maximise project performance/profitability (Oyedele, 
2012). This would appear to be a strategy that would integrate the design, 
construction, and operational phases, so that design decisions were optimised to 
minimise ongoing operational costs, and the risk of performance failure penalties. The 
frequency with which performance failures occur (e.g. Clark, 2005) and penalties are 
applied across a wide range of PPP projects – particularly in relation to social 
infrastructure projects – would appear to suggest that such integration was not 
widespread and/or effective. In particular, it would suggest a disconnection between 
asset and service delivery, which stifles consortium's ability to innovate. 
Accordingly this paper presents detailed findings of a case study of the multiple 
perspectives associated with PPP procurement of social infrastructure by an Australian 
State Government, when viewed from the SPV. In particular it seeks to identify 
perceptions of the FM function as a generator of innovation and value through the 
project’s entire life cycle. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
In the mid-90s Barrett (1995) identified that proactive FM involvement during the 
design phase of the project could improve service provision during the operational 
phase. This could improve and speed up the procurement process since it would 
ensure "that the commissioning, testing, training, and facility operations will not be 
treated as an afterthought, resulting in unanticipated changes that cost time and 
money" (Trinh et al, 2002; p115). From the client's perspective such proactivity had 
the potential to improve occupant health, satisfaction, and productivity (e.g.Oja, 2001: 
Raiford, 2002). Ideally these would be reflected in a full life-cycle approach during 
design and management decision-making (Nutt, 2000). On the other hand, failure to 
obtain FM input during a project’s design phase would likely result in an asset's sub-
optimal contribution to a client's business needs (Brown et al, 2001; p119). 
The asset-service delivery process was identified as a possible future direction for 
the FM profession, as “it places the operational value of facilities and infrastructure at 
the centre of concern, targeting the output needs of organisations, their staff and 
customers over a 25 to 30-year life-cycle”  (Nutt, 2000; p125). Identification of the 
strategic significance of FM to the long-term focus of PPP-type projects – particularly 
in the areas of facility operations and service provision – highlighted the significant 
influence of FM in the overall success of such a venture (Kadefors, 2008).  
FM-mediated project success is derived from increased cost efficiency and non-
cost performance measures experienced by public sector clients, resulting in 
competitive advantage for bidding consortia utilising FM integration during project 
development, design and delivery. UK Private Finance Initiative experience indicates 
a 25/75 split between construction and service delivery costs, emphasising the impact 
that service delivery can have upon project outcomes over the long-term (Campbell 
and Ridley, 2001; p9). 
The FM contractor plays a key role during both the development of a PPP bid and 
the subsequent detailed design process, which has significant consequences for its 
performance during the service delivery phases of the project. El-Haram and Agapiou 
(2002) detailed a number of specific responsibilities falling upon the FM contractor 
during these initial stages, which were abstracted thus: 
• development of FM cost breakdown structure, which may include operating 
and occupancy, maintenance and replacement, etc.; 
• estimation of FM costs; 
• reviewing and assessing the design from maintainability, maintenance, 
operability, and serviceability point of view; 
• identification and selection of the optimum maintenance and replacement 
strategies for the facility; 
• identification and selection of the optimum operating scenario; 
• liaison with the design and construction team to select the cost-effective 
design option that will optimise whole life costing through application of 
life cycle costing (LCC) techniques; and 
• liaison with the bid management team. (Swaffield and McDonald, 2008; 
p133) 
Swaffield and McDonald (2008) identified the desirability of undertaking detailed 
analyses of the life-cycle costs (LCC) associated with design alternatives. Their study 
was limited to contractors having their own in-house FM function, but interestingly 
they assigned responsibility for undertaking LCC as residing with the quantity 
surveying function. They found that LCCs were generally performed, however they 
did note that such calculations were not a universal requirement and that where they 
were omitted or overlooked it was the facility management function that bore the 
consequences. Additionally whilst others (e.g. Goyal & Pitt, 2007) acknowledged the 
importance of LCC to FM performance it can be seen that the risks associated with 
managing LCC within a PPP consortium by the FM function alone are immense. 
It was observed that an emphasis on LCC reduced the overall running costs of the 
facility over the life of the project (Goyal & Pitt, 2007), but that where the 
calculations were absent and the focus was once more on lowest capital cost the effect 
was a rise in running costs and the consequent decrease in profitability. It can be 
speculated that there could be less emphasis on the importance of LCC calculations in 
PPP consortia where design and construction, and facility management functions were 
undertaken by separate commercial entities.  
A principal advantage of PPP projects has been the purported increased innovation 
generated by successful consortia. The greatest scope for this occurs during the 
operational phase of the project. Mudrak, van Wagenberg, & Wubben (2004) offered 
an insight into FM firms’ innovation processes (not necessarily as part of a PPP), 
when they highlighted the importance of appropriate organisational environments 
within which to foster FM innovation. They suggested that such processes must be 
supported by effective implementation mechanisms and external linkages, undertaken 
with strategic intent. When translated into a PPP SPV this would imply close liaison 
with others in the bid development team, which would continue through the detailed 
design and construction phases (El-Haram and Agapiou, 2002). Critically this would 
require clear chains of communication and responsibility within the consortium itself, 
and between the consortium and client. Whilst the business relationships were 
frequently understood in linear terms the reality was that they were social networks 
requiring careful management, and clarity of purpose of direct and indirect factors 
(Besser & Miller, 2011; p128), resulting in a service that was acceptable to the client 
(Gallouj & Weinstein, 1997; p539). 
A survey of the Finnish FM sector revealed critical success factors in the supplier-
customer relationship that included: clearly defined and mutually agreed goals, mutual 
involvement, joint problem-solving, two-way information sharing, and partners' 
ability to meet performance expectations (Lehtonen & Salonen, 2006; P 73). 
Culturally speaking, openness, trust, and shared objectives are required to optimise 
outcomes from the FM function.  
Where FM is co-located within a single firm the extent to which integration is 
achieved would reflect the effectiveness of its culture and organisational structure. 
Where the FM function is outsourced the level of FM performance could be seen as a 
barometer of the supplier-customer relationship. However, when translated into a PPP 
context the situation would appear to be more complex, where multiple relationships 
would come to exist i.e. FM-consortium partners, and FM-service client (Oyadele, 
2012). 
For the FM function within a PPP two sets of conditions should be satisfied: firstly, 
the requirement to maximise the consortium's profitability, and; secondly the 
requirement to meet or exceed the client's minimum service specification (Campbell 
& Ridley, 2011). Clearly the two are mutually interlinked since attaining the former is 
hampered if the latter is not achieved, however the situation is not so clear cut. It is 
generally the FM provider who is penalised, directly or indirectly, for failing to meet 
minimum service requirements, and it is the FM provider who is most publicly 
identified with any such failures. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that FM 
contractors have been noted as adopting pro-client stances during the design phase of 
PPP projects in order to specify the highest quality products and materials, and 
therefore reduce their risk during the operational phase (Campbell & Ridley, 2011). 
Furthermore, this is not inconsistent with the critical success factors developed by El-
Haram and Agapiou (2002). 
The impact of design decisions over the long-term can ultimately be considered an 
issue of risk identification, mitigation, and transfer (Akintoye, Taylor and Fitzgerald, 
1998). Issues of performance specifications and levels of service delivery are best 
borne by those parties with the experience to make informed decisions as to how to 
meet them, and whilst the former lies in the province of the construction contractor the 
latter could best be considered the domain of FM (Kadefors, 2008). Moreover both 
could be improved by the incorporation of FM expertise during the design and 
construction phases of the project – indeed this is a critical issue (Oyadele, 2012). 
Implicit in all of the foregoing is the notion that a PPP changes character at certain 
critical points in its life, most notably at the time when the SPV finalises its financial 
arrangements, when design of the asset is finalised, and when the asset itself is 
delivered prior to commencement of service delivery. Clifton and Duffield (2006) 
examined the hypothetical integration of PPP and Alliance principles in order to 
improve risk allocation , indicating that such a hybrid arrangement might be suitable 
for certain types of PPP project. Their contention was that under certain circumstances 
a renegotiation of project scope might be necessary at practical completion (delivery 
of the constructed asset) prior to the commencement of service delivery. It would be at 
this juncture that the most visible FM involvement would commence, and potentially 
also the juncture at which refinancing or on selling of the concession could occur (Ng, 
Wong & Wong, 2011; p80). From the client organisation’s point of view this could 
also be the point at which uncertainty (and therefore their risk) associated with service 
provision would increase. 
 
3. Research Method 
PPP research has been based on the belief that asset construction and subsequent 
operation have been delivered by stable commercial entities whose members have 
worked towards achieving common project objectives over the long term. Indeed a 
parallel but unconnected body of knowledge, namely that relating to Product-Service 
Delivery/Integrated Solutions, is overtly directed towards this end, albeit in the realms 
of manufacturing and services. The study was therefore designed to commence the 
generation of new theory that bridged these two established areas.  
The PPP arena in Australia is not a large one when compared to others 
internationally. The limited number of projects potentially available for study turned 
out to be further constrained by issues of confidentiality. Moreover, given the 
immaturity of research in this field it was recognised that authentic, in-depth data had 
to be collected and new knowledge thereafter created before any attempt at 
generalisation could be undertaken. A detailed, multi-perspective case study of a PPP 
project within Australia thus became a research objective.  
The twin issues of political sensitivity and commercial confidentiality ensured that 
few firms/ and government agencies were comfortable with being publically identified 
with this study. To this end, key participants in a PPP project were identified from 
publicly available project documentation, invited to participate, and subsequently 
interviewed. The research team de-identified both project and participants. To this end 
it is necessary to limit description of the project to being a PPP for multiple social 
infrastructure facilities, commissioned by an Australian State Government. 
Philosophically the nature and extent of collaboration (Holt, Love & Li, 2000) in 
PPP projects by potential stakeholders is influenced by the contractual mechanisms 
designed for a specific project, the consequent perception and quantification risk 
exposure, and their impact on individual firms' commercial decisions. Such decisions 
are made on the basis of both rational and boundedly rational criteria (Simon, 1991), 
which embody formal and informal dimensions (Bresnen and Marshall, 2002). The 
phenomenon of decision-making in such an environment is best revealed using 
qualitative post-positivist approaches (Gajendran et al. 2011; Barrett and Sutrisna, 
2009). 
Methodologically this research was therefore designed using a constructivist 
perspective that accommodated consideration of multiple stakeholder realities 
(Creswell & Clark, 2007). This found its expression in a detailed single case study 
utilising ethnographic research methods, an approach that was considered appropriate 
in order to capture both phenomenon and the context within which it was being 
observed (Yin, 2009), thereby allowing context-specific generalisations to be made. 
The choice of a single case was considered methodologically appropriate as variously: 
• An "instrumental" case (Stake, 1995), where matters beyond the 
boundaries of the case itself (pertaining to PPPs in Australia) could be 
revealed. 
• A “critical” case (Flyvbjerg, 2006; p 230), where the strategic choice of an 
exemplar case could reveal matters pertinent to the general problem of the 
asset/service delivery split. 
• A “paradigmatic” case (Flyvbjerg, 2006; p 232), which highlights more 
general characteristics of Australian PPP projects. 
 
This case was also opportunistic given the researchers' access to key stakeholder 
organisations in a scarce Australian PPP project. In the event five interviews were 
conducted across the three functions – finance (one interview), construction (two 
interviews), and facility management (two interviews) – within the PPP consortium, 
supported by various documentation proffered by interviewees. 
The methods employed in this research were exploratory in nature and rooted in the 
realism paradigm (Guba and Lincoln, 2005). This approach “enables researchers to 
deal with complex, layered and often unobservable strata of reality that impact upon 
our action and thinking” (Joseph and Roberts, 2004; p1).  The research therefore had 
to fulfill two seemingly contradictory objectives: firstly to ask the ‘right’ questions in 
order to extract the fullest, most complete data whilst secondly, making no prior 
assumption as to what the ‘right’ answer might look like (Cohen & Daniels, 2001). 
This case study protocol used as its point of departure the idea that ideally that the 
FM function would be defined at the time of SPV formation, and that it would be 
geared towards both value maximisation for the client and profit maximisation for the 
concession stakeholders. A comprehensive literature review was therefore conducted, 
thematic analysis of the literature then performed in order to develop a coherent set of 
topics and questions for use in semi-structured interviews.  
Ten trigger questions were derived from the literature and then used to drive the 
interviews. These questions covered the following topics, from each respondent’s 
organisation's point of view: their understanding of the purpose and objectives of 
PPPs; their role in their organisation's business strategy and objectives; scope for 
expansion and growth of PPPs; role of FM function within a PPP consortium; points 
of involvement of FM in current PPP project; role of FM function in achieving PPP 
objectives; actual and potential value of FM in current and future PPP projects; 
estimation of value of FM involvement at various stages in PPP life cycle.The 
interviews were recorded, transcribed, cleared by the interviewees as true 
representations of their words, and subjected to detailed thematic analysis.  
First level coding was automatically derived from the transcripts according to 
question. Open coding of the transcripts was thereafter independently conducted by 
multiple coders to derive a set of themes spanning multiple questions and multiple 
interviews. Each of these was given detail through a process of axial coding during a 
second round of data analysis (Morse & Richards, 2002).  
All codes were supported by quotations from the transcripts accompanied by 
explanatory memos written by the coders. Codes were consolidated at a roundtable 
coding meeting where similarities and differences between coding outcomes were 
discussed and resolved. Overarching themes (13 open codes) and their details (94 
axial codes) were then developed and described (see Figure 1: extract from 
consolidated coding table relating to theme Value for Money), enabling them to be 
discussed in relation to existing literature where possible, and for new theory to be 
surfaced where current literature proved inadequate (Morse & Richards, 2002). The 
following section provides an overview of these findings. 
 
Take in Figure 1. Extract from consolidated coding table. 
 
4. Results 
The process of analysis revealed 13 themes within the data. These appeared across 
three temporal domains: client’s pre-existing expectations of the project; contribution 
of facility management to PPP performance, and; potential contribution of facility 
management to future PPP performance. These themes (in italics below) were 
previously detailed (Brewer, Jefferies, Gajendran, McGeorge, Rowlinson & Dainty, 
2012) and are now summarised in Figure 2. 
 
Take in Figure 2. Concept model of findings. 
 
Client decision-making in PPP procurement is primarily driven by the desire to 
achieve value for money. Probity dictates that this should be demonstrated through the 
use of positive Public Sector Comparator (PSC) outcomes – in this case stated to be 
7% below the PSC most likely costs – and politically, by securing new public services 
without capital expenditure. Whilst the former is a universal requirement, the latter 
was keenly felt to be driving decision-making in this jurisdiction. 
Concurrently, the government client wishes to engage in risk transfer to the private 
sector (with appropriate compensation) thereby achieving high levels of certainty, 
both in terms of minimum service standards and known costs, over the longer term. 
The achievement of client certainty is contingent upon the reputation of the 
concession team, with factors including credit rating, financial base, appropriate skills, 
and proven ability to be around for the duration of the concession period, and prior 
experience (Swaffield and McDonald, 2008).  
Incentives provided to reward the achievement of certainty take the form of either 
avoidance of client-imposed penalties for underperformance (on the current project, 
with consequent negative marketing implications), or demonstrable success, with the 
latter being publicly visible and providing the potential to win other projects. The 
strategic importance of both incentives is clear and apparent to all consortium 
members. 
In the light of the foregoing it is perhaps surprising that in this particular case study 
there is widespread acceptance that the risk distribution over the long-term has been 
heavily loaded on the FM function during the service period. This is largely at the 
behest of the client, through their onerous concession deed, which allows them to 
change their service requirements (and indeed, their FM service provider) during the 
operational phase (Akintoye, Taylor and Fitzgerald, 1998). 
Client demand for innovation from PPP consortia  largely focuses on the service 
delivery phase, and there is a perception that through their early involvement the FM 
function may develop the maturity for PPP leadership (as opposed to contractor-led 
consortia in the UK, and finance-led consortia as currently found in Australia). 
However this future is subject to contrasting external and internal perspectives of the 
FM function, where on the one hand the FM contractor places high emphasis on its 
"all-encompassing" service management and delivery, whilst on the other, SPV 
members site the as-yet unfulfilled role of the FM contractor in adding value through 
life cycle costing, involvement in design decisions and specifications writing (Brown 
et al, 2001).  
From the FM perspective their approval rights for detailed design decisions reduce 
the risk borne by the finance function through the double-checking of the construction 
contractor’s designs, but consequently increase their own risks as well as the 
likelihood of conflict within the concession team (El-Haram and Agapiou, 2002). 
From the other team members’ perspective the FM reticence to become more involved 
is symptomatic of the immaturity of the FM profession and personnel in Australia, and 
their consequent lack of design experience and poor market awareness. Moreover it is 
reported that the FM function is frequently excluded from the design phase of PPP 
projects specifically to reduce consultants’ costs. Nevertheless all parties recognise the 
potential FM value available to suitably balanced and qualified concession teams in 
the Australian market, and the consequent opportunities particularly in the 
replacement of ageing infrastructure. 
It is apparent (from the comments of non-FM interviewees who have bid for other 
PPPs) that the non-innovation and conservatism of the FM contractor has had a 
negative impact on subsequent consortium bids for similar projects. On the other 
hand, when viewed from the FM contractor’s perspective, there are compelling 
reasons for not committing to particular low-cost design solutions at the design phase, 
given that they will bear the consequences over the long term during the operational 
phase of the facilities (Goyal & Pitt, 2007). Moreover, such conservatism presents 
potential opportunities to increase the attractiveness of the facility management 
contract (i.e. reducing the perceived risk), should it be on-sold at some point. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
Over a decade ago Brown, Hinks & Sneddon (2001; p129) predicted the rise of multi-
disciplinary teams to deliver major public projects which " result in the amalgamation 
of existing PM and FM teams to produce a new overall management team which has 
sufficient breadth to supply projects with the core competencies of each discipline." 
As commonly constituted PPPs would appear to embody these principles, and 
provides the opportunity to overcome the problems reported in Brown et al (2001). 
Ten years on, and in a different country it would appear that their vision has yet to be 
fully realised.  
Yet all of the foregoing has to be set in a unique project context that is largely 
defined by incomplete contracts, set in a responsive regulatory environment (Ayers & 
Braithwaite, 1992). Judicious use of the mechanisms these describe is intended to 
resolve the problems that are by definition unforeseeable at the outset of the project, 
arising as a consequence of societal, stakeholder, and statutory changes during a 20-30 
year contract period. Central to their resolution is the distribution of the attendant 
risks, which should be borne by the party or parties most able to do so – FM is clearly 
likely to have the skills and experience, but unforeseeable problems equate to 
potentially limitless risk (Goyal & Pitt, 2007), certainly an unattractive proposition for 
any single business entity within a PPP consortium and possibly for the consortium as 
a whole. 
Against this background this research has revealed that the fusion of design, 
construction, and service delivery to public sector clients through PPP and related 
relational contracting mechanisms appears to display fragmented characteristics, with 
a disconnect being particularly apparent between the asset delivery and service 
delivery phases. This runs counter to the expectations of both the client and earlier 
researchers. In 2005 Lehtonen & Salonen reported the rise of relational procurement - 
particularly partnering - as an increasingly popular method of engaging the facility 
management function to the strategic planning of major organisations. Central to this 
was the notion that there should be a shared understanding of strategic objectives by 
the top levels of management in both the FM contractor and client organisation, 
though interestingly, at an operational level, activities tended to be conducted on a 
reactive and ad hoc basis. Though their findings were based upon a mass survey of 
practitioners in a market where PPPs and Alliance-type procurement did not exist they 
concluded that that the senior executives in both client and supplier organisations saw 
no need to continue their personal strategic relationships beyond initial establishment 
of the business relationship. 
In many respects this type of attitude can still be seen in this study, which leads to 
the speculation that all parties concerned, both then and now, limit consideration of 
strategic matters to the establishment of contractual relationships, presumably 
believing that all parties' strategic objectives will remain congruent for the duration of 
the contract. Given that Lehtonen & Salonen's (2005) study confined itself to 
partnering agreements – which, unlike PPPs lack explicit legal remedies - the current 
situation is all the more critical given the economic and business consequences of sub 
optimal FM performance. This attitude could be explained either by a high level of 
confidence in both the PPP consortium and its legal foundation, or simply a high 
degree of trust that the FM function will continue to satisfactorily bear the risks and 
perform over the long term. 
A further explanation for the failure of strategic relationships to develop and 
endure over the operational phase of a PPP may be found in Edkins & Smyth (2006), 
where a long-term tendency to abandon relational mechanisms in favour of legalistic 
ones was identified. Issues of ease, reliability, and demonstrable accountability were 
cited as reasons for this, though fundamentally any persistence with relational rather 
than legal client-supplier relationships was dependent upon the behaviour of specific 
people who had skills in utilising them. Crucially the deterioration or otherwise of 
relationships were observed both between the PPP consortium and client organisation, 
and more surprisingly within the consortium itself, with trust/trustworthiness being the 
critical determinant of outcomes. Ultimately Edkins & Smyth (2006) identified a 
private sector discomfort with relational transactions and a consequent unwillingness 
to invest in relationship management skills and techniques.  
Contractor-side participants in this study consistently echoed the position of 
Campbell & Ridley (2001) when they suggested that FM contractors appeared to 
display a disproportionately pro-client stance during the operational phase of PPPs. 
This typically manifested itself in them demanding the highest as-built standards as 
possible, in terms of materials, products, and finishes. This was understood in terms of 
minimising their risk exposure over the long term, given that they would bear primary 
responsibility for providing/exceeding minimum service requirements on behalf of the 
consortium over a protracted period. On the other hand this has repeatedly resulted in 
tensions appearing within the consortium studied in this research. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study investigated the extent to which SPV participants in a PPP project 
experience the influence of the FM function in its operations, the consequences of 
their involvement, and the potential for greater FM involvement in future PPP projects 
in terms of value generation and risk minimisation. It came to the following 
conclusions. 
A common complaint regarding PPP consortium membership was the high costs 
associated with bid preparation and tendering. The underlying intention of a 
consortium was to demonstrate a higher capacity to generate value for money for the 
client than any of its rivals. Implicit in this was the notion that all of the consortium 
members were acting in concert to achieve this aim. The case project (and those 
discussed by participants during this research) whilst by no means claiming to 
represent the spectrum of Australian PPPs, did nevertheless provide an interesting 
insight into the reality of value generation. In particular it highlighted the potential for 
conflict between the commercial aims of the individual consortium members and the 
project itself. 
It was apparent that the FM contractor saw its individual commercial interests, and 
therefore its competitive advantage as being derived from holding a position that 
could be seen to be at odds with the consortium itself, and indeed was by other 
consortium members. Such a position was defended by the FM contractor on the 
grounds of its focusing on its organisational core competencies, and therefore 
defending the best interests of the client. Conversely it was reported by other 
consortium members that such conservatism had been the undoing of the consortium 
when bidding for other projects. 
A key component in the design of this research was that the case selection could 
justifiably be described as "instrumental" – that issues of broader concern than simply 
understanding the case itself could be learnt through its conduct – and the research 
findings that arose from its conduct have given insights into both the behaviours of 
key case study participants, and their consequences, beyond the boundaries of the case 
itself. The literature is replete with references to "inexperienced" or "experienced" 
clients, linking these terms to their ability to adequately process complex procurement 
decisions, thereby extracting the best possible project outcomes (or not). The reported 
rejection of later PPP bids on the grounds of poor FM innovation is therefore an 
indication of the maturity of at least some client organisations. Moreover it refutes the 
notion that a conservative FM strategy based primarily on building maintenance and 
non-core janitorial services safeguard the client's interests and "give them what they 
want". To the contrary, it is apparent that the other PPP tenders described during the 
research interviews have eschewed the overly "safe" option in favour of the potential 
for innovation in the successful PPP consortia. From the methodological point of view 
the study could therefore justifiably claim to have demonstrated instrumentality. 
A further methodological intention was that this case study could be considered 
"critical" – obtaining information that permitted the logical deduction that findings 
were generalisable to all cases – though the evidence presented cannot convincingly 
support this outcome. Whilst, as the previous paragraph illustrates, the behaviour of 
the FM contractor certainly has had an impact (negative) upon the bidding 
performance of other consortia to which it has belonged, in a very specialised market 
containing few projects (Australian PPPs), there is insufficient evidence to suggest 
that all Australian FM contractors would behave in a similar fashion. However, given 
the limited number of players in the Australian FM sector who would have the 
resources and experience to qualify to bid for Australian PPP projects it is contended 
that this case presents sufficient evidence to qualify as a "paradigmatic" case – in 
essence becoming metaphorically representative of many, if not all Australian FM 
bidders in the PPP market. 
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Main 
code Axial code 1 
Axial 
code 2 Axial code 3 Axial code 4 Explanation 
Value for 
money 
Government 
objective 
Reduced 
costs 
Design   
Generic benefits espoused by 
proponents of PPP procurement Construction   
Maintenance   
Tendering   Single point of responsibility 
Public Sector 
Comparator   
Objective measure of value as 
compared to conventional public 
sector procurement and running 
costs 
Capital cost 
savings   
Politically beneficial accounting 
benefit whereby cost of securing 
new facilities and services is 
removed from capital expenditure 
column in ledger 
Reduced 
time 
Design    
Single point of responsibility 
Construction   
Repair Lost due to breakdown 
Increased efficiency triggered by 
financial penalty for non-availability 
of facilities 
Non-
government 
impacts 
Public 
impact 
Union 
members   Potential for public sector job losses 
Members of 
public   
Perception of service levels being 
endangered under PPP 
Two-tier 
service 
provision 
  
Perception of service levels being 
better when provided by PPP as 
compared to public sector 
provision. 
Political 
damage   
Political fallout in the event of 
demonstrable/perceived negative 
impacts of PPP 
Consorti
um 
impact 
Increased 
costs Tendering 
Extremely high costs of tender 
preparation 
Risk transfer Uncompen-sated 
Danger of 
unforeseen/unforeseeable risks 
going uncompensated 
Competitive 
advantage 
Reduced 
costs 
Business benefits associated with 
PPP procurement. Often limited by 
politically sanctioned constraints, 
particularly in relation to service 
innovation 
Reduced 
time 
Innovation 
          
 
Conceptual (from 
literature) 
Actual (from case 
study) 
Barriers (current) Benefits (future) 
PPP objectives Value for money Potentially limitless risk 
exposure 
Exclusion from design 
process 
Failure of relationships 
within consortium 
Protecting self-interest: 
* Reducing FM risk during 
operational phase by 
"over-specifying" 
* Increasing 
attractiveness of FM 
service package for future 
on-selling 
  
Risk identification 
and transfer 
Decision-making 
Certainty 
Incentivisation and 
penalisation 
Current FM role Risk-bearing 
Long-term 
Reputation 
Innovation 
  Potential FM role FM driving design phase 
Increased  innovation 
during service phase 
FM as consortium 
leaders 
 
